The Fall Of Shia Ideology And Rise Of Mujtahideen

This paper will briefly discuss the evolution of Usooli sect, their rise to power subsequent to the fall of traditional Shias and the causes and effects of this paradigm shift.

Today, the Usooli school has come to be known as mainstream of Twelver Shia Islam. However, when you look into historical reality, you will find that Usoolism evolved on the basis of controversial hypothetical concepts and perceptions of some scholars, centuries after the major occultation. Even in its early stages it was rejected by most of the prominent Shia scholars.

Among the earliest Shia Ulama such as Kulayni and Ibn Babawaiyya, the most important activity was transmission of hadith. [1]

The proud boast of Shia at this time was that whilst the Sunni law had to rely on such fallible methods as qiyas (analogical reasoning) and ijtihad (innovative exegesis), Shia were able to obtain knowledge directly from the traditions of the Imams. [2]

Initially during the Buyid period it was considered by the Twelver ulama that since the Imam had gone into occultation and there was no longer present his Naib al-Khass, the four Babs during the lesser occultation, all the functions invested in the Imam had lapsed (saqit). The principal functions of the Imam were:
a. Leading the Holy War (jihad)
b. Division of the booty (qismat al-fay)
c. Leading the Friday Prayer (salat al-juma)
d. Putting judicial decisions into effect (tanfidh al-ahkam)
e. Imposing legal penalties (iqamat al-hudud)
f. Receiving the religious taxes of zakat and khums.[3]

However, it soon became apparent that the situation caused by lapse of functions of the hidden Imam was extremely impractical and left the Twelver Shia community at a great disadvantage with no leadership, no organization and no financial structure [4]

While most perceived this as beginning of the age of Ghaibah; some saw opportunity and some unknowingly created room for opportunities to come.

The first transgression

As early as 5th / 11th century (more than a 150 years after Ghaibah), Shaykhu-t-Ta'ifa was reinterpreting the doctrine so as to allow delegation of the Imam's judicial authority to those who had studied fiqh. Although he implies in his writings that this function should only be undertaken by the ulama if there is no one else to do it. Shaykhu-t-Taifa considered the ulama as best people to act as agents of the donor in distributing the religious taxes since they knew to whom it should be distributed; but nevertheless individuals were free to do this themselves if they wished. He allowed fuqaha to organize the Friday prayers in absence of the Imam or his (Imam's) special representative.

The prominent Shia scholars who rejected this thesis were:

1. 'Alam Al-Huda.
2. Ibn Idris.
3. Allamah Al-Hilli.[5]

It is to be noted that 'Alam Al-Huda was from amongst the Shaykhu-t-Taifa's group.

The second transgression

By 7th / 13th century (i.e., 200 years after the first transgression), Muhaqqiq Al-Hilli was able to advance these concepts very considerably. He extended the judicial role of the ulama to iqamat al-hudud the imposition of penalties by ulama themselves. In his writings it is possible to see the evolution in his thinking whereby the fuqaha develop from the deputies of the donor for the distribution of religious taxes in his early writings to being the deputies of the Hidden Imam for collection and distribution of the taxes in his later works.[6]
In effect, transgressing the limits set by Shaykh-u-Taifa (two centuries earlier) in his first transgression.

The third transgression

Muhaqqiq al-Karkhi (About 300 years after the second transgression) was the first to suggest, arguing from the hadith of Umar ibn Hanzala, that the ulama were the Na'ib al-'Amm (general representative) of the Hidden Imam. But he restricted his application of this argument to the assumption of the duty of leading Friday prayers. [7]

The fourth transgression

It was Shahid ath-Thani who took the concept of Na'ib al-'Amm to its logical conclusion in the religious sphere and applied it to all of the religious functions and prerogatives of the Hidden Imam. Thus the judicial authority of the ulama now became a direct reflection of the authority of the Imam himself. It was now obligatory to pay the religious taxes directly to the ulama as the trustees of the Imam for distribution, and the donor who distributed these himself was considered to obtain no reward. (This is in direct contradiction to limits set by prior transgressions)
Furthermore, Shahid ath-Thani extended the range of those eligible to receive money from zakat to include the tullab (religious students) and the ulama themselves, who thus became the recipients of the money as trustees and students. Even in the field of defensive jihad, Shahid ath-Thani identified a role for the ulama. Only in the field of offensive jihad did he allow that the role of Hidden Imam had lapsed pending his return. [8]

Although the aforementioned scholars were not mujtahids in their full capacity, they introduced innovative concepts Bid'ah ( بدعة‎)   into Shia theology which later formed the basis of the ijtihadi school. Their innovations were sharply criticized by prominent Shia scholars of their time and thus, remained mostly theoretical.

The ulama of this period were overshadowed by the towering figure of Allamah Muhammad Baqir Majlisi. [9] Whose rejection of the emerging doctrine of ijtihad overwhelmed the attempts of the group of ulama with usooli tendencies (who were then in minority). However, after the death of Allamah Muhammad Baqir Majlisi, the influence of usooli way of thinking was increasing due to its promising nature towards the unconditional supremacy of ulama and the deal of freedom of practice it had to offer.

The traditional Shia doctrine was by its nature, fatal to leadership of any regime except that of Imam Al-Mahdi (as) since they believed that an Islamic state can be established only under the leadership of an infallible Imam. Thus, Shias had little role to play in supporting the decisions of the state; in contrast with the Sunni tendency of offering their full support to the Ottoman Empire. This caused a great deal of paranoia to the states where the Shia were in majority. By the end of Safavid era the situation had become intense due to the rise of imperialism on a global scale. Thus, it was necessary to develop an alternate ideology for the survival of Iranian state. This is when a group of ulama were encouraged to squeeze out the possibility of extending the state's control over the shia majority; by whatever means necessary.

This is when Mohammad Baqir ibn Mohammad Akmal al-Wahid Bahbahani led a campaign for propagation of usooli tendencies and worked extensively to crystallize usoolism into a full fledged school as to offer an alternative state-friendly version of shia fiqh. And earned the titles Mu'assis (founder of Usooli school), Murawwij (propagator) and Mujaddid (renewer).

The Qajar rulers perceived this innovation as the only hope for gaining full control over the Shia Majority in the country and offered their full support to Wahid Bahbahani's group.

Wahid Bahbahani surrounded himself with a corps of mirghadabs, servants who would carry out either corporal or capital punishment, and had his judgments carried our immediately and usually in his presence. [10] In effect, gathering for his school, a paramilitary force.

However, Bahbahani's deviation in theology was not welcomed by ulama who stood fast with the original Shia doctrines and rejected earlier transgressions too. This group of traditional Shia ulama came to be known as Akhbari or the traditionalists.

Although this controversy had begun as a minor disagreement on a few points, it eventually grew into a bitter vituperative dispute culminating in Bahbahani's declaration that the Akhbaris were infidels. [11] This fatwa of infidelity (Takfir) by Wahid Bahbahani shows how insecure he had been by the steadfastness of traditional Shia ulama.

Subsequently ulama who did not accept Bahbahani's authority were executed as per the fatwa of their infidelity.

At first the Akhbaris predominated at the shrine cities of Iraq but it was Bahbahani who, at the end of 18th century reversed this and indeed completely routed the Akhbaris at Karbala and Najaf.
South Iraq, Bahrain and a few cities in Iran such as Kirman remained Akhbari strongholds for a few more decades but eventually the usooli triumph was complete and only a handful of Shia ulama remained Akhbari to the present day. [12]

After the theological coup brought about by Wahid Bahbahani by military methods, the usooli school became instrumental to the Iranian regime. An example of its vital application can be seen below:

The fifth transgression

During the first Russo-Iranian War (1804-13), Fath Ali Shah's son and heir, Abbas Mirza who was conducting the campaign, turned to the (new) ulama and obtained from Shayk Ja'far Kashiful Ghita and other eminent clerics in Najaf and Isfahan, a declaration of jihad against the Russians, thus implicitly recognizing their authority to issue such a declaration – one of the functions of the Hidden Imam. Furthermore Kashiful Ghita used the opportunity to extract from the state acknowledgement of the ulama's right to collect the religious taxes of Khums. [13]

This followed the pattern of other transgressions by overthrowing the limits of its prior (fourth) transgression.

Conclusion

1. It can be noticed that the usooli ulama have usurped one by one all the functions of the Hidden Imam; virtually ascribing themselves with his Imamate.

2. Since Bahbahani's coup, the usooli ulama have made countless transgressions from Wilayat Al-Faqih to Ittihad Bayn al-Muslimeen. The convergence of these trends can be seen heading towards the caliphate of mujtahideen, although with a different naming scheme.

3. The alleged usooli claim that Akhbari Shias were a movement that started four centuries ago and was intellectually defeated is a false and desperate attempt to hide the uninspiring past of the usooli sect. Traditional shiism was in fact strict adherence to the original shia doctrines and rejection of far reaching opportunistic innovations.

References:

[1] Pg. 185, An introduction to Shi'i Islam, Moojan Momen.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Pg. 189, An introduction to Shi'i Islam, Moojan Momen.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Pg. 189 / 190, An introduction to Shi'i Islam, Moojan Momen.
[6] Pg. 190, An introduction to Shi'i Islam, Moojan Momen.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Pg. 127, An introduction to Shi'i Islam, Moojan Momen.
[10] Pg. 128, An introduction to Shi'i Islam, Moojan Momen.
[11] Pg. 127, An introduction to Shi'i Islam, Moojan Momen.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Pg. 191, An introduction to Shi'i Islam, Moojan Momen