THE NATURE OF THE AKHBARI/USULI DISPUTE IN LATE SAFAWID IRAN. PART 1: 'ABDALLAH AL-SAMAHIJI'S 'MUNYAT AL-MUMARISIN

He [i.e. Shaykh Yasin], may his eminence persevere, said 'What is the difference between our mujtahid and the Akhbari-?? 'I say: 'The difference between the two is clear upon [application of] fair treatment and avoidance of partisanship and arbitrariness. It is based on different viewpoints and principles which no one will dispute who abandons the noose of prejudice and " who has a heart or who gives an ear and is attentive" (Qur'an 50:37). 1. [1] The mujtahids require [the practice of] ijtihad as an individual obligation or optionally.  The Akhbaris declare this unlawful. They require recourse to the trans-mission [as related] either [directly] from the Infallible or from someone who transmits from Him, however many intermediaries [there may be]. They have definitive evidence for this from the Qur'an and the sunna. There is not space for [citing] that [evidence] in this brief exposition [and] we have collected it in a treatise for whose completion, revision, and conclusion we beseech God. 2. [2] The mujtahids say: In our opinion, there are four sources of evidence: the Qur'an, the sunna,7 consensus,8 and the evidence of reason.9 The Akhbaris accept [as evidence] only the Qur'an and the sunna. Indeed, some limit themselves solely to the sunna. [The latter maintain] this is because the Qur'an is not known to them since its exegesis is permitted only to Them, on Them be peace. One cannot say consensus and the evidence of reason are included in the Qur'an and the sunna.'0 [This is] because we say if it were as you maintain the division [i.e. of the proofs] into four would be meaningless. One cannot say these two are supportive [but] not independent evidence. [This is] because we maintain if it were as you said the [fourfold] division would not be sound, since a part [of the division] would [no longer] remain as a part."' 3. [3] The mujtahids permit recourse to legal judgements based on conjecture. The Akhbaris forbid this. They accept only sure knowledge. For them this knowledge is [of two categories:] definitive-that is what corresponds to the reality-, [and] normal and transmitted-, that is what is confirmed to have been transmitted on the authority of the Infallible. They [i.e. the Akhbaris] believe this [transmitted knowledge] cannot be erroneous; this is on the basis of normal, customary usage. The Lawgiver and the experts in language and convention call this sure knowledge.'2 [The Akhbaris define] conjecture as what results from ijtihad and deduction without [recourse to] transmissions. Recourse to transmission is not called conjecture. On the prohibition against conjecture [the Akhbaris] cite proofs from the Qur'an and the sunna. Among these [proofs] are God's words: "Conjecture is sin" (Qur'an 49:12); "Conjecture cannot replace the truth" (53:28); "Those who guess will perish" (51:10); "Do not follow that of which you have no knowledge " (17:36); Do not " say things of God of which you have no knowledge" (2:169, 7:33). [They also cite] the statement of the Imams, on Them be peace, " Speak what you know, not what you do not know." And [there are] other clear proofs and outstanding evidence. Because of their generality and absolute nature, qualification of [these statements] based on usul [al-fiqh] (the principles of legal methodology) is arbitrariness. The [counter] criticism [advanced by the mujtahids], that acting on the basis of the akhbar is nothing but conjecture, is rejected. This is not called conjecture linguistically, nor in convention, nor legally. To admit the possibility of contradiction [of the truth] in it [i.e. in the akhbar] does not exclude it from [being a kind of sure knowledge] because, on the basis of normal experience or practice, legal knowledge cannot contain any contradiction. [This is] not [that knowledge in which the possibility of its contradicting the truth is denied] absolutely. This is because accepting [what has been transmitted] by the transmitters is permitted [by the Imams] but conjecture is prohibited. [The juxtaposition of these two, permission and prohibition, demonstrates that acting on the basis of the traditions (which is permitted) is not an instance of acting on the basis of conjecture (which is prohibited), because13]i nconsistency in Their statements is not permitted. In sum, they [i.e. the Akhbaris] have many clear proofs on this for which there is not enough space herein. 4. [4] The mujtahids classify the traditions into four categories: sound, good, reliable, and weak.' The Akhbaris, however, classify them into [two categories:] correct and weak. Properly speaking, if acting on the basis of a tradition which is not sound but rather is good or reliable is permissible, then it is sound; otherwise it is weak. The terminology is [, therefore,] fourfold in letter but twofold in meaning. 5. [5] The mujtahids define the sound [tradition] as what the reliable, righteous Imami narrates on the authority of a similar individual back to the Infallible. The good [tradition] is that whose transmitters, or one of them, is a praise-worthy Imami not designated as reliable. The reliable is that whose transmitters, or one of them, is [classified] reliable [but] not an Imami. The weak is anything else. The Akhbaris define the sound [tradition] as what has definitely come and is proved on the authority of the Infallible. The degrees of soundness and certainty vary: sometimes [these are] based on successive transmission and sometimes on isolated traditions 15 accompanied by complementary evidence which attests to the soundness of the tradition. [These complements include:] conformity with the Qur'an or consensus, or its being supported by other traditions, or other complements which attest to sure knowledge-as detailed by al-Shaykh [Muhammad b. al-Hasan al-Tiusi (d. 460/1067)] 16 and others-or if the tradition is [transmitted in] one of those reliable usul 17 acknowledged as sound by the Imamis. The weak is anything else. Our shaykh,'8 the most erudite of the age, said, " It is sometimes said that deviating from the earlier terminology occurred with al-'Allama [al-Hilli], may God have mercy on him, [and that] then subsequent scholars followed him. This [terminology] was not known before him." 6. [6] The mujtahids divide the community into two groups: mujtahid and muqallid (follower). The Akhbaris maintain all [members of] the community are followers of the Infallible and there is no mujtahid at all. 7. [7] The mujtahids say: During the period of the occultation sure knowledge is to be sought by means of ijtihad. During the period of the Imams' presence within the community [they maintain sure knowledge is to be sought] by recourse to the Infallible, even if through intermediaries. Ijtihad is not permitted in such circumstances. That was the practice of those who transmitted akhbar from the Imams. The Akhbaris do not distinguish between the period of the occultation and the [Imams'] presence. Rather, "What is lawful [according to the Prophet] Muhammad is lawful until the day of resurrection, and what is unlawful according to Him is unlawful until the day of resurrection. There will be nothing else other than it [i.e. the Law], and nothing else will come," as in the hadith. 8. [8] The mujtahids permit only a mujtahid [to issue] a formal legal opinion and to occupy a judgeship and the position of muhtasib. They do not permit following someone who is not a mujtahid. The Akhbaris forbid this. They maintain that rather the transmitter of the traditions of the Ahl al-Bayt, on Them be peace, [that is] the one informed as to Their judgements [, is authorized to undertake these tasks]. They do not permit following the mujtahid with respect to a statement or action for which no statement has been transmitted from the People of Infallibility. This is based on the statement of [the sixth Imam Ja'far] al-Sadiq (d. 147-48/765), on Him be peace, " Look to one of those among you who narrates our traditions "; 19 and the statement of our Master, the Mahdi, on Him be peace, " As for future contingencies, seek recourse concerning them from the narrators of our traditions. They [i.e. the narrators] are my proof to you and I am the Proof of God to them "; and Their statement, " Distinguish the ranks of the rijdl on the basis of their transmission from Us." To interpret all these [instructions as referring to] the mujtahid who sometimes makes statements based on transmission and sometimes by deduction is unjustifiable. 9. [9] The mujtahids classify the 'alim now [i.e. during the occultation]-the one to whom [legal] recourse is required-as [either] an absolute mujtahid or a partial mujtahid.20 The Akhbaris say the 'alim is of one type, the partial one. He knows some judgements through transmissions, but not all. [The latter] are those for which he knows no transmission which necessitates sure knowledge. [They maintain] there is no absolutely knowledgeable authority who knows all the judgements except the Infallible. However, [knowledge] may be of different levels [for different people]; [an individual] may be more or less thorough. This is because we deny the possibility of a mujtahid who can derive applied law from the usul although he has perfected his intellectual tools and the strength of his preparedness-in all judgements such that he does not hesitate on an issue nor waiver in a judgement. None of our [i.e. Twelver] 'ulama' surpass what al- 'Allama [al-Hilli], on him be the mercy of God, achieved so far as the faculty of deduction. [Yet,] his books are full of [instances where he could not make a decision and so] refrained [from issuing a ruling] and faced legal difficulties. One cannot say that had he spent [more] time and expended [more] effort he would have succeeded. [This is] because we maintain if he had the ability he would have accomplished this. None of the other Sunni 'uluma' achieved what the Four fuqaha achieved.21 Rather, perhaps only they [i.e. these four Sunni scholars] attained [the level of] absolute ijtihad. [Yet] it is soundly reported of [one these four, Abu 'Abdallah] Malik [b. Anas (d. 179/795)] that he was queried on forty issues and on thirty-six he replied " I do not know ". 10. [10] The mujtahids say: No one attains the level of issuing a legal ruling and knowledge of the traditions except the individual who knows the six principal disciplines.22 These are theology, legal methodology, Arabic grammar, verb conjugation and lexicography, logic, and the four sources of the law-that is, the Qur'an, the sunna, consensus, and the evidence of reason. Some maintain [this level] can be attained only by the individual who knows approximately fifteen disciplines. The Akhbaris stipulate only [the ability] to understand Arabic. This involves [a knowledge of] some points of [Arabic] grammar and verb conjugation-some even deny that knowledge of Arabic grammar and verb conjugation is always a condition [for attaining that level], but there is no room [here] to discuss this question-and knowledge of the terminological conventions and the discourse of the Imams, on Them be peace. Nothing else is stipulated except that on which understanding Arabic is based. 11. [11] When the akhbdr disagree the mujtahids decide preference based on [their own] opinions and reflections. The Akhbaris permit this only based on what they have of the transmitted preferences [of the Imams], such as the accepted tradition of 'Umar b. Hanzala and others like it, except where necessity dictates. The latter situation is as if a tradition came which contradicted the sound, established traditions and could not be reconciled based on the preferences stated in the traditions but [only] by some kind of interpretation. So it is not possible at this time to reject it or act on it if the contradictory report is sound and safe and conforms with the practice [of the Twelver community]. This is because adherence to [such a tradition] is forbidden in the akhbdr. Our shaykh [i.e. Sulayman al-Bah.rani al-Mahuzi], the most erudite of the age, may God sanctify his secret, in one of his replies concerning the differences between the mujtahid and the Akhbari, said " Among these is that when there is a contradiction in the akhbar the Akhbaris do not determine preferences except based on the rules established by the Ahl al-Dhikr [i.e. the Prophet and the Imams24], may the peace of God be upon Them, which Thiqat al-Islam [Muhammad b. Ya'qub al-Kulayni, d. 329/941] mentioned in the preface to al-Kafi. If they [i.e. these rules] are absent, then according to some akhbar [it is proper to] abstain, as He [the Imam], on Him be peace, said, 'Defer this until you meet your Imam.' However, according to some other [traditions this is a matter of] an option and action based on what one chooses [from among the two] as an act of submission, as He [i.e. the Imam] says' You are free to choose whichever of the two you choose as an act of submission.' Some [try to] reconcile the two [above instructions by maintaining that] the first pertains to worldly matters, such as inheritance, etc., in which there is no room for option [because each tradition conflicts with the interests of the other party], and the second [pertains to] all other instances. Thiqat al-Islam [al-Kulayni in al-Kafi apparently supported [the concept of the individual's] choice in all cases [i.e. in both worldly and religious matters], although the matter was to be referred to the 'alim, on Him be peace. He, on him be the mercy of God, said 'We find nothing more cautious and accommodating than referring knowledge of all this to the 'alim, and accepting the ease and accommodation which He offered in His statement " You are free to choose whichever of the two you choose as an act of submission".' Here ends [al-Kulayni's statement]. As for the mujtahids, their interpretations are based on ijtihad without limits or enumeration. Most of [these interpretations] are extremely far-fetched. Perhaps following the Akhbari path in giving preference is more sound." Here ends the statement of our shaykh [i.e. al-Bahrani al-Mahuzi], may God elevate his grade [in Heaven] and add to the weight of his scale [of good works]. In it, as you see, is fairness to the Akhbaris, acknowledgement of the inferiority of the principle of the mujtahids, confirmation of the differences between the two groups, and examination of the dispute between the two factions. 12. The mujtahids do not permit anyone to infer any of the legal norms nor [anyone] to act who comes to know the law of a specific case with certainty by means of transmissions, unless he attains the level of ijtihad. [Such a person] is not classified as an 'alim or a faqih but rather an apprentice and follower, even if he has a thousand traditions relevant to that specific case. He is obliged to refer to the opinion of the mujtahid and his conjecture and to abandon what he knows of the traditions. The Akhbaris maintain the ordinary believer is permitted to, indeed is obliged to, act on the basis of the tradition-even if it is isolated-if it is sound, confirmed [as having been transmitted] from the Infallible, and unambiguous in guidance, when [the individual] comes to know [such a tradition] and knows it is not contradicted by a similar [tradition]. [They maintain] he [i.e. the ordinary believer] is not permitted to refer to the mujtahid in [decisions he makes in] the absence of a tradition which is sound and whose guidance is clear. 13. The mujtahids permit acting on the basis of those traditions which allow [differing] interpretations, and some which have a more obvious interpretation [than the one they choose]. [They hold] likewise with respect to Qur'anic verses. The Akhbaris do not permit this. Rather they act only on the basis of unambiguous traditions and firmly-established [Qur'anic] verses in which there is no vagueness in accordance with customary usage and [the Arabic] language. [This is] because according to them, in conformity with the explicit instruction in the Qur'an, it is not permitted to act on the basis of the Qur'anic verses which are obscure.26 14. [13] The mujtahids permit judgement with regard to [the two categories of] desirable or reprehensible based on weak traditions. Indeed some maintain the fatwa of the mujtahid can itself be the basis for judgement [that something is desirable or reprehensible] without any [textual] evidence. The Akhbaris do not distinguish between the five categories of rules.27 For them sure knowledge must be based on evidence. 15. [14] The mujtahids maintain that when the mujtahid dies it is no longer valid to follow him and his fatwa. [They maintain] the statement of the dead is like the dead. The Akhbaris maintain truth does not change by virtue of life or death because the truth does not change. God willing the explanation of this will come in the following question. 16. [15] The mujtahids permit recourse to the ostensible meaning of the Qur'an absent agreement with the traditions. Indeed [for them] this is preferable to recourse to the traditions because, unlike the khabar, the text [of the Qur'an] is definitive and its evidence may be definitive. [They maintain] the text [of the khabar] is not definitive and its evidence may not be definitive. The Akhbaris do not permit recourse to the ostensible meaning of the Qur'an except that whose exegesis has come on Their authority, on Them be peace, or what conforms with Their traditions. [This is] because the only individual who knows the Qur'an is he to whom it was spoken and because the Qur'an contains both what is firmly established and what is ambiguous. What is "firmly established " is clear and without doubt. Anything else is ambiguous. No one knows " what is ambiguous " except " those who are firmly rooted in the religious knowledge ". These are the Imams, on Them be peace, as is in the text of the [Qur'anic] verse 28 supported by the text from transmissions. It is not permitted, therefore, to utilize vague ideas without an explicit designation. They deny the correctness of the preference of following the text of the Qur'an in accord with what we have said, and reject the argument for their preference. Rather they [i.e. the Akhbaris] claim for the akhbar what they [i.e. the mujtahids] claim for the Qur'an. They say that among the akhbar also there are those which are definitive in text and definitive in evidence like the firmly established successively transmitted [akhbar]. All of the Qur'an's being definitive in text does not help because it is not all definitive in evidence. Therefore, not every Qur'anic verse is suitable as evidence. And the akhbar [are also like that]. So consider this [carefully]. 17. The mujtahids permit ijtihad in [the formulation of] legal judgements in the event it is impossible to know the statement of the Infallible. The Akhbaris do not make such a distinction but require recourse to Him absolutely. If His statement can be established [the Akhbaris] will propound it; if not they keep silent and make no decision. Thus they are in agreement with Their statement, on Them be peace, " Whenever you know, speak; but if you do not know, then this ", and He stretched out His hand to his chest; 29 and Their statement, on Them be peace, " Matters are of three [sorts]: a question wherein integrity of conduct is clear, so it should be followed; a question wherein delusion is clear and should be avoided; and, a difficult question, knowledge concerning which should be referred to God and His prophet." 30 In the good [khabar] of Hisham b. al-Hakam, he said to Abu 'Abdallah [i.e. Imam Ja'far al- Sadiq], on Him be peace, "What is God's right in relation to His creatures? " He [i.e. the Imam] replied, "That they speak what they know and refrain from what they do not know. If they do that they render to God His right." There is also Their statement, on Them be peace, "When you do not know [the legal status] of whatever comes to you, you must avoid it and be careful, and refer it to the Imams of the Truth so that they can instruct you as to the correct way in that instance, remove the ambiguities, and teach you what is the truth about it." Almighty God said, "Ask the Ahl al-Dhikr if you do not know" (Qur'an 16:43). There are also many other akhbar. 18. The mujtahids believe that when the mujtahid attains the truth he is due two [heavenly] compensations: one for attaining the truth and one for his effort. [Even] if he errs, he is due [one] compensation for his effort and his toil. In support of this they cite a tradition of the Prophet, may the blessings of God be upon Him and His Family. The Akhbaris maintain [that] in any instance [the mujtahid is committing] a sin. [This is] because if he attains the truth he will have rendered a judgement without sure knowledge from God when he derives it without a transmission. If he attains [the truth] based on [a narrative] this is not [what is called] ijtihad. If he errs then he will have lied about God. Abu Basir relates: " I said to Abu 'Abdallah [i.e. Imam Ja'far], on Him be peace, 'Where things are referred to us about which we have no knowledge from the Qur'an or sunna should we not examine them?' He said,' No indeed. If you attain the truth you will not be compensated. If you err you will have lied about God, may He be exalted and glorified."' Al-Kulayni related this in al-Kdfi as did Ahmad b. Muhammad b. Khalid [al-Barqi (d. late third century/ ninth century)] in al-Mahdsin. And in [Man ld Yah.darahu] al-Faq[h, [Muhammad b. 'Ali al-Qummi, Ibn Babawayh (d. 381/991-92)] al-Saduq related from [Imam Ja'far] al- sadiq, on Him be peace, [that] He said " There are four [sorts of] judges [of whom] three are in Hell and one is in Paradise. A man who knowingly judges in accordance with injustice is in Hell. A man who unknowingly judges in accord with injustice is in Hell. A man who unknowingly judges in accord with truth is in Hell. A man who knowingly judges in accord with truth is in Paradise." [There is also] Their statement, on Them be peace, " There are two [sorts of] judgements. The judgement of God and the judgement of ignorance. Whoever errs in the judgement of ignorance attains the judgement of God, and whoever errs in the judgement of God attains the judgement of ignorance." There are many akhbar with this intent. [There are also] the Qur'anic verses, " Who does not judge in accord with what God has revealed, they are the wrongdoers " (Qur'an 5:45), " and they are the sinful " (5:47), " and they are the unbelievers " (5:44). They [i.e. the Akhbaris] deny the soundness of the tradition which they [i.e. the mujtahids] transmit on the authority of Him [i.e. the Prophet], on Him and His family be peace, because it is in none of the books of our traditions. On the contrary it is transmitted solely by the Sunnis and is one of their fabrications.31 As for the transmission of it by our companions in usul al-fiqh, this is an inadvertence of theirs. If it were sound it would be contradicted by the sound traditions of our companions which agree with the Qur'an and disagree with the Sunnis. These are two correct methods for determining preference in the akhbar. There are also two other methods. One of these is al-shuhra (widespread knowledge). This is [based on] Their statement, on Them be peace, " Take that which has become widely-known among your companions and cast aside the anomalous which is not well-known." Clearly the transmissions we have cited are well-known among those of our companions who specialize in the traditions unlike that [tradition of the Prophet which they cite]. The second [method] is conformity with caution. This is one of the bases of giving preferences as is related in the transmissions. 19. The mujtahids say: In relation to the mujtahid questions are one of two [sorts]. Either it is a question whose evidence is clear even if based on conjecture. Then adherence to that is obligatory. Or it is question whose evidence is unknown. Then it is obligatory to take recourse to the bases in the Almighty's rules themselves. Hesitation and caution are not required. The Akhbaris say: On the contrary, in relation to someone other than the Infallible these questions are [of] three [sorts]. [The first is] a matter in which right conduct is clear and is to be pursued. [The second is] a matter [in which] delusion is clear and is to be avoided. [The third comprises] uncertainties between these.32 Whoever follows a course based on uncertainties is doing what is forbidden. He will perish because he has no knowledge. Caution is obligatory with regard to every issue on which there is no text transmitted on Their authority, on Them be peace. 20. The mujtahids maintain the correctness of inferring doctrines on the basis of the evidence of the theologians absent agreement with the Qur'an and the traditions. The Akhbaris do not permit this as you have already seen. 21. The mujtahids maintain the correctness of inferring the principles of the sources of evidence in fiqh from the principles of legal methodology deduced by the Sunni 'uluma'.33 The Akhbaris do not permit this. On the contrary, they maintain the necessity of being limited in matters of legal methodology and positive law to the evidence found in the traditions. [This is] based on the statement of [Imam Ja'far] al-Sadiq, on Him be peace, " Do not take [religious instruction] except from Us; this way you will be one of Us "; and His statement, on Him be peace, "Woe to you if you propound something you did not hear from Us "; and His statement, on Him be peace, " All of what does not come from this House is invalid "; and His statement, on Him be peace, "By God, we wish you to speak when We speak and to be silent when We are silent. We are what is between you and God, may He be exalted and glorified. God did not make it good for anyone to oppose Our command "; and His statement, on Him be peace, "The people have neither truth nor what is proper except what comes from Us, Ahl al-Bayt "; and His statement, on Him be peace, " If you want sound knowledge it is with us, Ahl al-Bayt. We are Ahl al-Dhikr of whom God said, 'Ask Ahl al-Dhikr if you do not know'" (Qur'an, 16:43); and Their statement, on Them be peace, to one of Their companions, " Go east or west and by God you will never discover sound knowledge except with those to whom Jibra'il came down "; and the statement of God, " Ask Ahl al-Dhikr if you do not know "; and others of their proofs they have for this. 22. [18] The mujtahids do not permit inferring doctrines from the Qur'an and traditions. Indeed some sometimes forbid inferring issues in usul al-fiqh from the traditions if this is based on isolated [traditions]. [This is] because they require certainty in legal methodology and the isolated tradition does not provide this. The Akhbaris maintain the opposite as you have already learned. 23. [16, 19] The mujtahids permit difference of opinion on legal issues based on conjectural ijtihad. They do not declare sinful someone who makes a statement contrary to the truth on issues of positive law in so far as the basis of the judgements is conjecture. Each of them allows the other to be correct even if he thinks he is in error. The Akhbaris do not permit difference of opinion and declare sinful someone who makes a statement contrary to the truth. [They do so] on the basis of the verses [of the Qur'an] and the transmissions which furnish evidence of this, and the statement of the Commander of the Faithful [i.e. Imam 'Al], on Him be peace, censuring the disagreement of the 'ulama' in their issuing of a fatwa: " An issue may be referred to one of them concerning a certain legal ruling and he gives a ruling on the matter based on his opinion. Exactly the same question is then referred to someone else, and he issues a ruling which disagrees with his [i.e. the first's] judgement. Then the judges come together with their Imam who appointed them to judge, and he declares all their opinions correct. [Yet] their God is the same, their prophet is the same, and their scripture is the same. Did God the Most High command them to disagree and so they obeyed Him? or did he forbid them and they disobeyed? or did Most Holy God reveal a flawed religion and ask them for help for its completion? or are they partners of God, exalted and glorified, and so they have the right to make their own decision and He has to be content? or did God reveal a complete religion but the Prophet, blessings on Him and His Family, did not impart it properly while Most Holy God said 'We neglected nothing in the Qur'an' (Qur'an 6:38), [... to the end of] the tradition." This is an explicit [statement] about what is claimed [by the Akhbaris], except when the disagreement does not stem from a deduction or ijtihad but rather from a disagreement in the akhbar. Perhaps some understand these [akhbar] convey the truth but others understand they convey taq7ya, or one does not know it is contradicted, or two disagree in their understanding [of the akhbar] after each had striven and undertaken research to understand them, and each reached a decision based on what he understood. This is excusable because he used the tradition but was unaware of its meaning. The unaware [person] is excused as long as he is unaware, based on what was .said to [Imam Ja'far] al-Sadiq, on Him be peace, " I left your companions disagreeing so can I pray behind them?" He [i.e. the Imam] said, "I have left them to disagree"; and His statement, on Him be peace, "It is permitted [for them to] use what the Imam says even if it is taqiya"; and Their statement, on Them be peace, " You are free to choose whichever of the two you choose as an act of submission." And so in other traditions. If the disagreement arose from the Imams, on Them be peace, for the benefit of taqiya, disagreement then is not forbidden if someone is unaware of what has been transmitted in reality concerning the truth. This is not like disagreement in issues related to ijtihad, all of which have been shown to belong to general principles and rational deductive rules which are not present in the traditions at all. There are many of these, such as Their statement that the command [to do] something necessitates forbidding its opposite; and Their statement, "The command is for duty and the prohibition is for making unlawful "; and Their support for the method of priority, deduced cause, and continuance in the legal issues themselves after the occurrence of the issue at hand; and Their statement that the speech of the lips is not universal; and Their statement that man is under obligation [to act] on the basis of his conjecture, to other rules and principles which do not result in an outcome. 24. [20] The mujtahids forbid the mujtahid to refer to someone inferior or equal to himself in sure knowledge if he has not found a tradition. Rather he is obliged to refer to his knowledge and his rules. The Akhbaris, by contrast, make incumbent on him searching and asking for the legal norm and seeking traditions from someone else even if from a student or an ordinary believer. He must not make a statement [on the issue] on the basis of his [own] opinion. This is based on the statement of the Imams, on Them be peace, " The people perish only because they do not ask questions"; and Their statement concerning someone afflicted with smallpox whom [the people] washed but [who] then died: "They killed him. Why did they not use sand [for ritual purification]? Why did they not ask questions? The remedy for ignorance is raising questions." 25. The mujtahids maintain all the Shi'i 'uluma' in the period of the occultation were mujtahids. The ancients, from the time of al-Kulayni to the time of al- Shaykh 'All b. 'Abd al-'Ali [al-Karaki] (d. 940/1534) and [Shaykh Zayn al-Din b. 'All] al-Shahid al-Thani (d. 965/1557), [were thus] one [i.e. all mujtahids]. The Akhbaris differ with them on this. They maintain the ancients, such as al-Kulayni and al-Saduq and those like them, were Akhbaris. Al-Sayyid ['AIl b. al-Husayn al-Musawi] al-Murtada (d. 436/1044), al-'Allama [al-Hilli], the two martyrs,34 and al-Shaykh 'All [al-Karaki], and others of that sort were mujtahids. The correctness of this claim and the falseness of the other are clear. 26. [1] The mujtahids maintain ijtihad is obligatory either collectively or individually. The majority maintain the first and the minority maintain the second. The Akhbaris maintain rather that seeking sure knowledge is a [religious] obligation on every Muslim, that the seeking of sure knowledge [means] taking it from the Infallible, on Him be peace, directly or by an intermediary or intermediaries, that all the people are followers of Him-just as the mujtahids say it is obligatory to take [sure knowledge] from the mujtahid directly or by intermediary or intermediaries-and that the scholar and the ignorant [individual] who takes from the scholar by an intermediary from the Infallible or directly are [both] called a knower of the judgement he has learned, and that seeking sure knowledge is not obligatory except in case of need. 27. [21] The mujtahids do not allow anyone to uphold a legal norm none of the previous 'ulamd' has vouchsafed even if he has clear evidence on the issue. The Akhbaris do not distinguish between the precedence of someone who upheld the judgement or the lack thereof. [This is] because action is based on evidence, that is solely the statement of the Infallible, on Him be peace. [Action is] not [based on] the maker of a statement-even if there are many [of the latter]-absent Him. 28. The mujtahids require the study of the disciplines of al-adab such as grammar and morphology, logic and theology and similar [disciplines]. [This is] because this is a condition in ijtihad which is a collective obligation. The study of the[se] premises is a collective obligation because what is accomplished only by that [i.e. by what is obligatory] is itself obligatory. The Akhbaris require nothing of this. [This is] because understanding traditions does not depend on it, sure knowledge does not depend on the discipline of theology, and because the faqih does not need the discipline of logic at all. To inquire about the tradition, to understand it, and to be acquainted with its wording are sufficient in seeking sure knowledge. 29. [22] The mujtahids do not apply [the term] " the reliable " in transmissions except to the righteous, exactly transmitting Imami. The Akhbaris maintain that on the contrary the meaning of " the reliable" in the discourse of scholars of earlier generations of learned personalities is nothing but the individual who is reliable in transmission [and] trusted not to lie. This is known by means of social intercourse. Neither [his general] trustworthiness nor his probity are mandatory. 30. [23] The mujtahids among us maintain that obedience to the mujtahid is as obligatory as obedience to the Imam, although they permit [the mujtahid] to err but do not grant this [possibility] to the Infallible. Regarding the infallibility of the Imam they argued that if the possibility of His making an error were allowed it would follow God had initiated evil since He ordered that He be followed while following Him in a case of error is evil. Thus God would have commanded it. This is impossible because it contradicts the evidence of justice. It is this exactly which is valid against them concerning the mujtahid. None of this applies to the Akhbaris because they require obedience only to the Imam and do not require obedience to the scholar, unless his source is the Imam and the Imam had commanded it. If not, obedience to him [i.e. the scholar] is not required. The situation [of the two groups] is thus different, and the difficulty disappears. 31. The mujtahid and the Akhbari are combined in one matter but separate on another, demonstrating that between them there is a generality and a particularity in one respect. They are combined where the 'alim has attained the qualifications for ijtihad, but does not permit inferring norms except on the basis of the transmissions. [Such an individual] is a mujtahid-muhaddith, like al-Muhaqqiq [Muhammad] al-Amin al-Astarabadi, Maulana Khalil [b. Ghazi] al-Qazwini, al-'Allama Muhsin al-Kashani, Maulana Muhammad Tahir [al-Shirazi] al-Qummi, Maulana 'Abdallah al-Yazdi,35 and our shaykh [Muhammad b. al-Hasan] al-Hurr al-'Amili. The mujtahid is separate from the muhaddith if he has attained the qualifications [for ijtihad] and permits deduction, employment of the rules of legal methodology, the rational sources of evidence, and consensus, without a tradition which is clear or sound, general or specific. [This is] like al-Murtada, [Muhammad b. Mansuiir]Ib n Idris [al-Hilli (d. 598/1202)], al-'Allama [al-Hilli], those who succeeded him such as his son Fakhr al-Din [i.e. Fakhr al-Muhaqqiqin, Muhammad b. al-Hasan al-Hilli (d. 771/1370)], the two martyrs, al-Muhaqqiq al-Shaykh 'All [al-Karakqf, and others like them. The muhaddith is separate from the mujtahid if he has not attained the qualifications for ijtihad and possesses knowledge and understanding of the traditions, like those of the students of our shaykh al-Hurr [al-'Amili] with whom we spoke-of whom there are many in holy Mashad-and some of those with whom we have spoken elsewhere. They have knowledge of the traditions greater than [common] knowledge; indeed, perhaps it exceeds the knowledge of the mujtahids because, with regard to the meanings of the traditions, the mujtahids overstep all bounds with regard to the meanings of the traditions [to reach a point] not intended. He [i.e. such an individual] is an Akhbari not a mujtahid. This shows there is a difference between the two. 32. [17, 24] The Akhbaris do not permit action on the basis of presumed exoneration in denying the prohibition of a positive action-for example, denying the prohibition for an individual to touch the text of the Qur'an when he has annulled his state of ritual purity with a minor infraction-nor in denying a conventional norm-such as, for example, denying that an excretion from [a path] other than the two paths [i.e. urinating or excretion, e.g. vomiting] destroys [the state of ritual purity]. They permit action on the basis of this [principle] in denying the necessity of a positive action-such as denying the obligatory nature of the witr prayer-not with respect to the principle of exoneration, but rather based on what is widely reported from Them, on Them be peace, that " The people are free [from an obligation] as long as they do not know" and " Something about which God has shielded knowledge from His servants is [a burden] lifted from them." 33. [24] In the event of contradictory akhbar the Akhbaris do not permit determining preference on the basis of presumed exoneration. The mujtahids permit this. 34. [29] A group of Akhbaris-including the scholar al-Amin al-Astarabadi, may God sanctify his secret, in al-Fawd'id al-Madaniyya-permit delay of the explanation beyond the time of need. The mujtahids agree on its being forbidden. The disagreement among them, however, concerns [the issue of] the delay of explanation beyond the time of the making of the statement. 35. [25] The Akhbaris do not permit action on the basis of the consensus claimed in the statements of our recent fuqaha if there is no path to sure knowledge based on the inclusion of the statement of the Infallible, on Him be peace, without a transmission from Him. Some mujtahids agree with them on this. [This is] because [they maintain] consensus may not be a proof without the ascertainment of the [inclusion] of the statement of the Infallible, since, by common agreement among us, it [i.e. consensus] is not evidence in itself. Rather it sheds light on the statement of the Proof, that is the Infallible. If not a single transmission on the issue on which consensus is claimed is traced back to Him, not to mention general circulation or widespread successive transmission, how is the statement of the Infallible ascertained? If the latter is not ascertained, it is certainly not evidence or a proof. You know that in the mujtahids' discourse it [i.e. consensus] is one of the proofs, such that a group of them claim consensus related on the basis of an isolated tradition is a proof, after the model of action on the [basis of] the isolated transmitted tradition. This [claim] is invalid because acting on the basis of an isolated tradition is authorized based on numerous, indeed widespread successive, traditions. [This is] unlike the statement based on one isolated tradition containing a claim of consensus. 36. [26] The mujtahids-or the majority of them-do not take notice of disagreement [in consensus] where the name of the individual disagreeing is known. This does not detract from consensus. As for the Akhbaris, they do not take notice of this basis [i.e. of consensus]. They do not distinguish between [an opponent whose] name is known or one [whose name is] unknown. Rather action is based on evidence and consensus is absolutely not evidence of His view, as you know. Rather evidence is the statement of the Infallible. If that is ascertained, whether it is with someone known or unknown or not, that [statement] is evidence. If [it can]not [be ascertained to be the Imam's statement] it is not [evidence]. 37. [17, 24] The mujtahids maintain the basic state in [legal] questions is permissibility. [This is] based on the statement of the Imam, on Him be peace, " Everything is unrestricted until prohibition comes down concerning it ", and on the basis of the universality of the Almighty's statement "He made for you all that is on the earth" (Qur'an, 2:29). The Akhbaris hesitate on this. Rather, according to them where something does not have a text permitting it there is no means to permitting or forbidding it. Rather it is in the category of uncertainty. [Legal] issues are of three [sorts]: [that] wherein lawfulness is clear, [that] wherein prohibition is clear, and between that [categorization there are] uncertainties. I hesitate on this question. Indeed, what seems clear to me is preference for the statement of the mujtahids based on [Qur'anic] verses and transmissions. God knows best. 38. [27] The Akhbaris believe in the soundness of all that is in the four books 36 except what they determine to be weak. [This is] because these [traditions] are either successively transmitted or detailed or are those whose link to the People of Infallibility, on Them be peace, is known, as more than one of them [i.e. Akhbari scholars] has explicitly stated. The mujtahids do not maintain this. 39. [28] The Akhbaris do not permit action on the basis of continuance except where the text indicates it, such as " Everything is pure until you know it is impure ", and " If you have performed ablutions then do not perform them again until you know you have become defiled ", and other similar statements. Some mujtahids, such as [al-Sayyid] al-Murtada, agree. Our Shaykh [Sulayman al-Bahrani al-Mahuzi], the most erudite man of the Age, said " and this is the stronger one [of the two opinions] for me". For the majority of the mujtahids it is a proof. Indeed al-Muhaqqiq [Ja'far b. al-Hasan al-Hilli (d. 676/ 1277)] in al-Mu'tabar counted it an equal portion to the four proofs, making it a fifth [proof]. Subsequent scholars included it within the proof of reason. 40. The mujtahids require the mujtahid to refer to the principles of legal methodology and its rules derived by the Sunni 'uluma, such as [Abu 'Abdallah Muhammad b. Idris] al-Shafi'i (d. 204/820) and [al-Nu'man b. Thabit] Abu Hanifa (d. 150/767). All agree that the first to devise the principles of jurisprudence were the Sunnis. The first of these was al-Shafi'i, as a group of the 'uluma' have explicitly stated. The Akhbaris do not make this obligatory. Indeed they do not permit this except where the statements of the People of Infallibility point to it. According to them it is obligatory only to refer only to the rules of the People of Infallibility.